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Particle  distribution  patterns  from  explosive  releases  are analyte  speciﬁc.
Applications  of  mathematical  models  to particle  movement  are  unsuitable.
The  dominant  particle  dispersal  mechanism  is  the smoke  plume,  governed  by the  wind.
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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  continued  usage  of  explosive  devices,  as  well  as the ever  growing  threat  of ‘dirty’  bombs  necessi-
tates  a comprehensive  understanding  of  particle  dispersal  during  detonation  events  in  order  to  develop
effectual  methods  for targeting  explosive  and/or  additive  remediation  efforts.  Herein, the  distribution
of  explosive  analytes  from  controlled  detonations  of aluminised  ammonium  nitrate  and  an RDX-based
explosive  composition  were  established  by  systematically  sampling  sites  positioned  around  each  ﬁring.
This  is the  ﬁrst  experimental  study  to produce  evidence  that  the  post-blast  residue  mass  can  distribute
according  to an  approximate  inverse-square  law  model,  while  also  demonstrating  for  the  ﬁrst  time  that
distribution  trends  can  vary  depending  on individual  analytes.  Furthermore,  by  incorporating  blast-wavearticle
ispersal
esidue
overpressure  measurements,  high-speed  imaging  for ﬁreball  volume  recordings,  and  monitoring  of  envi-
ronmental conditions,  it was  determined  that  the  principle  factor  affecting  all analyte  dispersals  was  the
wind  direction,  with  other  factors  affecting  speciﬁc  analytes  to  varying  degrees.  The  dispersal  mechanism
for  explosive  residue  is  primarily  the smoke  cloud,  a ﬁnding  which  in  itself  has  wider  impacts  on  the
environment  and  fundamental  detonation  theory.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V. This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license. Introduction
The majority of research related to post-blast chemical data is
entred on the development of novel sampling techniques and opti-
isation of analytical methods for trace explosive residues. Whilst
hese are necessary and important research foci, a distinctly dispro-
ortionate amount of research has been conducted in establishing
he types of trace chemicals that may  remain following detona-
ion in the ﬁrst instance. For example, how do explosive residues
emain in their undecomposed form during detonation, how do
hey disperse, and therefore where can they be found in the envi-
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304-3894/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article u(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
ronment? By answering such questions, we would be better placed
to act in the aftermath of a radiological dispersive device (‘dirty’
bomb) or improvised explosive device modiﬁed to contain chemi-
cal or biological warfare agents, for example. Knowledge regarding
the dispersal and fate of particles would not only beneﬁt environ-
mental decontamination efforts but would also assist in forensic
investigations. Undetonated explosive particles that remain after
detonation can provide critical intelligence regarding the explosive
charge used and indicate the perpetrators of an explosive attack
[1]. Current knowledge regarding post-blast residue location has
developed with experience over time but the prevailing require-
ment to be prepared to face new threats [2], as well as validate
and strengthen the scientiﬁc underpinning of forensic practices [3],
calls for further research.
Given the impracticalities of experimenting with explosive
charges modiﬁed with hazardous additives, we  ﬁrst focus on
monitoring the distribution trends of known explosive ana-
nder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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ytes during detonation. In doing so, it will become possible to
evelop models that can assist in elucidating the particle dispersal
ehaviours of other, more harmful, potential additives. Both 1,3,5-
rinitroperhydro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX) and ammonium nitrate (AN)
re widely used explosives, in both military and criminal contexts,
hich leave undetonated residues and for which the decomposi-
ion mechanisms have been studied extensively. In the solid state,
he most supported mechanism for the initial unimolecular decom-
osition step of RDX begins with the loss of a single NO2 molecule
4] via homolytic cleavage of an N NO2 bond [5,6], which is fol-
owed by the rupture of the chain into intermediate products. The
nal gaseous products formed through these decompositions are
nergetically stable and form strongly bonded species such as CO2,
2O and N2 [7] (Eq. (1)).
3H6N6O6(s) → 3CO(g) + 3H2O(g) + 3N2(g) (1)
Whilst RDX has a deﬁcient number of oxidising atoms for com-
lete combustion (oxygen balance (OB) of −21.6%), theoretically,
o parent explosive molecules should remain following detona-
ion. The energy release is increased as the fuel-rich product gases
ndergo afterburning with atmospheric oxygen, which is facilitated
y turbulent mixing within the ﬁreball [8].
The decomposition of the bimolecular AN has been studied
roadly but is not understood as well [9]. Investigations into the
ffect of the shock stimulus on AN decomposition have indicated
he break-up of the NH4+ ion occurs initially, possibly followed by
ecomposition of the NO3− ion [10]. Ultimately, the gaseous prod-
cts formed are N2, H2O and O2 [7]. As a fuel-lean explosive (OB of
20%) AN combusts fully (Eq. (2)).
H4NO3(s) → N2(g) + 2H2O(g) + ½O2(g) (2)
The addition of combustible light metals (e.g. aluminium) to
on-ideal explosives such as AN, improves their energetic efﬁ-
iency by increasing the reaction velocity and temperature [7,11].
n the case of aluminised ammonium nitrate (AlAN), the high tem-
erature AN decomposition products heat the aluminium particles,
hich evaporate upon reaching their ignition temperature and
eact in the gaseous phase; either aerobically with oxygen in shock
ompressed air or anaerobically with oxidants in the detonation
roducts [12,13]. Reactions occur behind the principle reaction
ront during the expansion of the gases [13–16], with the main
ombustion product being aluminium oxide [14,15]. Given that
he afterburning of aluminium releases more energy, which further
nhances the blast effects by increasing the overpressure impulse
roduced [12,15,17], it is again counter-intuitive to expect any
ndecomposed AN molecules to remain post-blast.
Due to the transient, dynamic nature of detonation, it is an
nderstandably challenging task to experimentally investigate the
eans by which undetonated explosive residue ‘survives’ deto-
ation; it is generally accepted that incomplete combustion will
lways occur to varying degrees depending on the explosive type. It
ay  be possible to infer the mechanism(s) however, by investigat-
ng how distribution trends vary between different explosives. Our
ecent review [18] of explosive residue dispersion theories high-
ighted the effects of the blast-wave and ambient wind ﬁeld as the
wo principal potential mechanisms by which explosive residue is
ispersed − neither of which have been tested experimentally. The
esidue distribution patterns have been purported to be based on an
nverse-square law distribution [19] (Eq. (3)); a seemingly logical
heory for spherical explosive charges (if the particles are assumed
o be ejected uniformly from the charge surface), but one that has
ot been veriﬁed.ass1/Mass2 = Distance22/Distance12 (3)
One of the factors thought to affect the resulting detectable
mount of explosive residue is the ﬁreball [19]; the exposureus Materials 316 (2016) 204–213 205
of which onto nearby surfaces may  cause degradation of any
deposited intact explosive particles and therefore alter any pre-
liminary inverse-square type distributions.
Experimental work to date is mainly limited to studies [20,21]
conducted to understand residue distribution at ground-level in
order to control explosives leaching through soil and into ground-
water. Fewer studies have investigated particle distribution by
incorporating perpendicularly positioned sampling sites around
detonations of both military and improvised explosives. The few
that have [22–25] found conﬂicting trends of both decreasing and
increasing amounts of explosive residue as a function of increasing
distance from the charge centre, where issues with sample analysis
may  have affected the results. Challenges with detecting post-blast
residues have led to the use of taggant material as a marker for
the explosive [26]; the question of the suitability of such markers
in achieving this aim remains open however. Additionally, likely
due to the cost of conducting ﬁring trials, the inclusion of repeated
ﬁrings are limited in previous work. In the limited cases where
repeat ﬁrings have been possible, variations in the quantity of post-
blast explosive residue detected on similar sites following ﬁrings
of the same explosive charge, conﬁgured in the same manner, have
demonstrated the unique nature of each detonation event [25].
Using a military and improvised explosive formulation, this
study is the ﬁrst to systematically assess the explosive residue dis-
tribution patterns formed following detonations. We  incorporate
repeated ﬁrings and measurement of blast overpressures, environ-
mental conditions and ﬁreball growth in order to test the variables
hypothesised to affect explosive particle distribution.
2. Experimental
2.1. Materials
Fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (AN) prills (Hydro Agri Ltd.,
UK) were ground to less than 1 mm in diameter using electric
processors (average particle size; 0.8 mm). Aluminium powder
(10 m–150 m average particle diameter, provided by Defence
Science and Technology Laboratories, UK) was mixed into the AN
in a 10:90 (mass fraction) Al:AN ratio to produce the improvised
aluminised AN (AlAN) explosive charges. The military composition
used was Plastic Explosive Number 4 (PE4), consisting of 1,3,5-
Trinitroperhydro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX) (mass fraction of 88%) as
the explosive ingredient and hydroxyl–terminated polybutadiene
(HTPB) (mass fraction of ∼12%) as the binder (provided by Cranﬁeld
Defence Academy). Each explosive was  moulded into six spheres of
0.5 ± 0.001 kg mass each in order to conduct repeat ﬁrings (approx-
imately 81.79% and 91.89% theoretical mass density for the organic
and inorganic charges respectively). SX2 booster charges (88% RDX
and 12% non-explosive plasticiser) and No. 8 Instant Electric deto-
nators (containing ∼0.7 g of Pentaerythritol tetranitrate) were used
to produce detonation.
2.2. Experimental design
All ﬁrings were conducted at the Explosive Range and Demon-
stration Area (ERDA) at Cranﬁeld Defence Academy. Charges were
positioned atop wooden ﬁring poles and secured in place with
adhesive tape around the base of the charge and top of pole. In
order to prevent crater formation, and therefore comply with range
operating procedures, each charge was  placed 2 m from the ground.
New ﬁring poles were used per detonation. Booster charges and
detonators were positioned in the charge centres from underneath
the charge (detonator tip pointing up) and initiation was therefore
directed vertically upward in order to avoid directionally biased
expansion of product gases in any of the horizontal orientations.
206 N. Abdul-Karim et al. / Journal of Hazardous Materials 316 (2016) 204–213
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pig. 1. Experiment set-up, (a) schematic of steel sampling plate attachment on sam
xplosive charge, at 1 m incremental distances and four orientations around the ce
he  ﬁring range.
In order to directly capture and sample for post-blast residues,
n array of steel ‘witness’ plates (300 mm × 200 mm × 0.80 mm)
as arranged around each charge. Plates were secured 2 m from
he ground onto steel ‘sampling’ poles that were positioned in four
rientations around the central ﬁring pole and at 1 m incremen-
al distances from it (Fig. 1). Plates were positioned perpendicular
o the ground instead of parallel to it as sampling for explosive
esidues on surfaces around a blast (that are not on the ground)
s more likely to occur on perpendicularly positioned sites such as
alls or signposts. The sampling poles were hammered into the
round to secure them in place. All sampling poles were positioned
ffset with each other (i.e. not directly in front or behind each other)
o avoid obstruction of the furthest sampling sites by those closer
o the centre.
.3. Data collection methods
Quartz piezoelectric pressure gauges (Piezotron® type 211B,
istler, USA) were mounted on 2 m high supports and positioned in
he south-east orientation around each charge. The distance of each
auge (1 m,  2 m,  3 m and 4 m)  was measured with a laser distance
easurer (Leica Disto D210) and each was aligned directly behind
he other in order to accurately record the blast wave proﬁle. Data
as collected for duration of 20 ms  and processed with a 25.0 MHz
igital oscilloscope (Nicolet Technologies Sigma 90-8) and based
n the waveforms from each ﬁring the peak positive pressures and
ntegrated impulses were calculated.
Each ﬁring was recorded using a high-speed imaging (HSI) cam-
ra in order to estimate the ﬁreball and smoke plume volumes
roduced. A Phantom V12.1 camera (Vision Research, UK) was
perated in monochromatic mode at 1280 × 800 full widescreen
esolution and 6000 frames per second (fps). The camera was sit-
ated 75 m south from the ﬁring area, facing north for each of the
rings.
The environmental conditions, including temperature, humid-
ty, barometric pressure, and wind speed and direction were
easured and recorded in the centre of the ﬁring area at 2 m from
he ground prior to each ﬁring using a Kestrel 3500 weather meter.
Explosive resides were collected using sterile cotton swabs
30 mm diameter, Medline Industries, USA), moistened with 5 cm3
eionised (DI) water (Sigma Aldrich, UK) for the inorganic explo-
ives and with 5 cm3 of acetone (>99.8%; Sigma-Aldrich, UK) for
he organic explosives; these were used to swab the entire plate
urfaces facing the detonations. Each swab was held with dispos-
ble sterile polystyrene tweezers (VWR, SA) that were individually
acked and opened only prior to sampling. Swabs were applied poles, and (b) aerial view of sampling pole positions around centrally positioned
t was  not possible to position sampling poles at 8 m and 9 m due to the terrain on
with pressure horizontally and vertically ensuring the whole plate
surfaces were sampled thoroughly and consistently for 30 s each
before returning the swabs into 10.5 cm3 glass squat vials with snap
on caps (Scientiﬁc Glass Laboratories, UK) containing the original
5 cm3 of solvent. Vials were labelled with the position of the plate
relative to the central ﬁring area and upon returning to the labo-
ratory were refrigerated at ∼4 ◦C. In addition to the test samples
obtained after ﬁrings, in order to ensure contaminant free equip-
ment and chemicals, swabs of blank (without explosive) plates and
blank swabs were extracted for control purposes, as well as blank
samples of each solvent used.
2.4. Chemical analysis
Sample vials were sonicated (Grant MXB22 Ultrasonic bath) at
25 ◦C for 30 min, after which the swabs within were further agitated
by pounding with new glass Pasteur pipettes for 2 min in order to
further promote the removal of explosive from the swab into the
solvent. The extracts were then pipetted into 10 cm3 disposable
polypropylene syringes (Sigma Aldrich, UK) ﬁtted with 0.2 m pore
nylon ﬁlters of 30 mm diameter (Chromacol, UK). Each ﬁltrate was
then deposited into new, labelled 10.5 cm3 glass vials.
To the original sample vials, still containing the swab, an addi-
tional 5 cm3 of DI water or acetone was added to the inorganic
and organic samples respectively and agitation via sonication and
Pasteur pipettes was  repeated. This second extract was removed
through the swab until dry and ﬁltered into the vials containing
ﬁltrate.
A 1.5 cm3 aliquot of the ﬁltered aqueous samples was  pipetted
into 1.8 cm3 chromatography vials (Chromacol, UK) for analysis of
NH4+ and NO3− via ion chromatography (IC). The acetone in the
organic ﬁltrate was evaporated and 1.5 cm3 of HPLC grade acetoni-
trile (ACN) (99.8%, Sigma Aldrich, UK) was pipetted into each vial to
dissolve any RDX residues, to be transferred into chromatography
vials for high performance liquid chromatography-mass spectrom-
etry analysis (HPLC–MS).
Operating conditions for the following analyses are detailed
in Appendix A of Supplementary material. Analysis of NH4+ and
NO3− was performed using IC on a Dionex ICS-2000 reagent free IC
system with eluent generation (Thermo Scientiﬁc, USA) coupled
to an SRS-300 auto-suppression device and conductivity detec-
tor. Samples were analysed for aluminium content using a Varian
720–ES inductively coupled plasma-atomic emission spectrometer
(ICP–AES) with an SPS3 autosampler, against matrix matched stan-
dards of 1% (volume fraction) nitric acid. HPLC was performed with
an Accela capillary LC system (Thermo Scientiﬁc, UK) with gradient
azardous Materials 316 (2016) 204–213 207
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Table 1
Mass range and radii within which the majority of analytes were detected.
Analyte LOQa Mass rangeb Radiusc (m)
NO3− 0.1 mg/L 0 − 14 mg <10
NH4+ 0.5 mg/L 0 − 0.3 mg <10
Al 40 g/L 0 − 1 g <10
RDX  0.1 mg/L 0 − 20 g 5N. Abdul-Karim et al. / Journal of H
icro-pumping system, degasser and thermostated ﬂow manager.
DX was measured in negative electrospray (ESI) mode using the
on trap mass spectrometer. To all samples 0.1% CHCl3 was  added
n order to form RDX adducts with chlorine (m/z 257 observed as
M+Cl]- ions) under negative mode ESI conditions (see Appendix
 of Supplementary Information). The quantiﬁcation of RDX was
chieved by using the reconstructed ion chromatogram generated
or selected ion monitoring (SIM) set at m/z  257 and the area under
he peak was calculated as corresponding to the concentration of
DX in the solution injected on the C18 column.
In order to quantify the residues, individual analyte stock
olutions (Fisher Chemical, UK) were used to make calibration
tandards of concentrations ranging between 0.1 and 1000 mg  L−1.
alibration lines were constructed by plotting peak area against
oncentration for each analyte. Linearity was evaluated via the R2
egression coefﬁcient of determination (all generating R2 values of
ver 0.95). Further to the calibrants, quality assurance (QA) stan-
ards of each analyte were also produced in order to assess the
ccuracy of the calibration. Calibration standards were analysed at
he beginning, middle and end of each sequence and QA samples
nalysed at multiple points throughout. All calibrants, QA standards
nd post-blast test samples were injected in triplicate. Details of the
alibration results are presented in Appendix A of Supplementary
aterial.
. Results and discussion
Values pertaining to the amount of explosive detected are
imited by the efﬁciency of sample collection and instrument sen-
itivity to target analytes, and are therefore relative to the absolute
ass of explosive deposited, which cannot be accurately known.
he explosive recovery technique efﬁciency was evaluated by con-
ucting controlled tests; analyte losses incurred through swabbing,
onication, ﬁltering, and evaporation procedures, resulted in an
verage recovery of between approximately 25% and 45% of known
mounts of RDX and AN deposited onto surfaces respectively,
ith similar recoveries reported elsewhere [27,28]. Full details and
esults of the controlled tests are presented in Appendix A of Sup-
lementary material.
.1. Particle distribution patterns
Initially, the analytes were not found to distribute very strongly
ccording to the theoretical inverse-square law model (red R2 val-
es inset in Fig. 2), however on exclusion of the datum recovered
rom 1 m,  ammonium, nitrate and RDX corresponded better, gen-
rating R2 values of 0.8562, 0.9958 and 0.9286 respectively (black
2 values inset in Fig. 2a, b and d). The aluminium distribution did
ot correlate as well, generating an R2 of only 0.1907 with the 1 m
atum, and of little improvement to a linear ﬁt when this datum
as excluded (R2 0.1959, Fig. 2c).
This is the ﬁrst time that the distributed explosive residue
ass has been shown to correspond approximately to a theoret-
cal model since the inverse-square law was posited to be suitable
or understanding particulate dispersal during explosive releases
19]. But these correlations were only improved when the 1 m data
as omitted (particularly for the nitrate and RDX), indicating that
ess residue may  deposit at these points due to, for example, blast
ressure or ﬁreball temperature effects at such a ‘close-in’ range.
oreover, this comparison was only signiﬁcant when established
sing the total mass of explosive residue detected at each distance
the sum of the four sampled orientations about the centre), which
as then averaged over the 6 repeated ﬁrings. On examination of
he analyte mass, per distance, that was distributed after each ﬁr-
ng, the association with the theoretical law became weaker. In fact,a limit of quantiﬁcation.
b range of detected amounts of each analyte.
c limiting radius around detonation within which residue was detected.
only the AN exhibited a noticeably constant decrease in mass as the
distance from the detonation increased (Fig. 3a and b) (an anomaly
to this being the ammonium trend after ﬁring 3 (Fig. 3a)).
The aluminium distribution was  distinctly different, with the
greatest amounts detected 5 m from the detonations following
the majority of ﬁrings (Fig. 3c). The Al had the smallest aver-
age particle size range of between ∼10 to 80 m (compared to
∼30–1300 m and ∼10–500 m of AN and PE4 respectively), and
this could explain why it dispersed further to be detected in its
greatest quantities at 5 m,  as different particle sizes have been
found to distribute to different distances around a detonation [29].
The ability to discriminate between elemental aluminium parti-
cles that remain from the AlAN composition and aluminium from
any oxidised products formed during the afterburning process may
also be an important criteria in understanding this trend. ICP-AES
would not have been able to distinguish between the two however,
and moreover, it is likely that any remaining elemental aluminium
would be subsequently oxidised in the surrounding atmosphere
after deposition onto a sampling plate (i.e. naturally rather than
due to afterburning following detonation). Such issues signify that
while the aluminium may  indeed disperse via a different mech-
anism to that of the base explosive charge analytes, future tests
with an inert material additive would allow further examination
of this phenomenon. The variations between Al and AN distribu-
tions nonetheless demonstrate that if taggants or additives are to
be used as markers for explosives, they must be chemically incor-
porated into explosive molecules, otherwise it is not necessarily
the movement of the explosive that is established.
In contrast, the amount of RDX detected ﬂuctuated with increas-
ing distance, with, in most cases, the greatest mass detected from
plates positioned at 2 m (Fig. 3d). Such oscillating trends have been
observed for organic post-blast residues previously [30]. This signi-
ﬁes that the application of one theoretical concept to the dispersal
of multiple analytes during detonation is unsuitable. The variation
between the distribution behaviour of the inorganic and organic
analytes could be due to their different detonation behaviours (i.e.
how the undetonated particles are ejected from their origin) or vari-
ations in the stability of the analytes on closest positioned sampling
sites (i.e. the potential thermal degradation of RDX  by the ﬁreball),
which will be discussed further in Section 3.3.
The wider-spread distribution of the AlAN residues (detected
up to 7 m)  compared to RDX (majority detected within 5 m)  may
be explained on a simple mass variation basis; the production
of greater quantities of undetonated residual AN from the AlAN
charges (up to 50 fold compared to RDX, see Table 1) would
distribute over a greater area compared to the RDX. The radii estab-
lished here correspond well with ﬁndings from previous studies
that have detected explosive residue between only 2 m and 5 m
[31], within 10 m [32,33], and within 15 m [34]; whilst this sup-
ports the practice of sampling for explosives near and around the
blast centre [19], it also demonstrates that samples can be taken
from areas other than the seat or centre of the detonation. As sam-
pling sites could not be placed at 8 or 9 m during these ﬁrings, the
detection radius for the inorganic analytes could have been fur-
ther than 7 m,  and without this data are therefore stated as <10 m.
208 N. Abdul-Karim et al. / Journal of Hazardous Materials 316 (2016) 204–213
Fig. 2. Total amount of explosive residue detected at each sampled distance compared to ‘1/d2 ′ representing the inverse-square law model, where d is the distance from
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n a post-blast scenario however, for small charges such as these,
he application of more sensitive analytical techniques to samples
ollected further from 7 m from detonations would be required in
rder to yield beneﬁcial explosive signals.
.2. Explosive residue mass
The detected mass of Al was comparable between repeated ﬁr-
ngs (the anomaly being after ﬁring 1, c.f. Fig. 3c), but this was  not
he case for AN or RDX (Fig. 3a, b and d), which therefore reaf-
rmed the notion that each detonation event is unique [7,11]. The
eproducibility of the trends however, particularly for the inor-
anic analytes, demonstrates that despite the varying amounts of
esidue detected (which has been found before, [25]), the analytes
ispersed in a consistent and reliable pattern.
Additionally, the analytes were detected in different quanti-
ies compared to each other. More ammonium nitrate (mg  range)
as recovered in comparison to RDX (g range) (Table 1). The
igher velocity of detonation (VOD) PE4 (∼8440 m/s) [11], having
 thinner, faster moving shock-front, would cause a more efﬁcient
ecomposition of explosive molecules. The slower VOD of the AN
ased compositions (∼5000 m/s) [35] is due to the oxidising com-
onent required for combustion not being within the fuel molecule;
he resulting wider, slower moving detonation wave through the
harge may  allow for more undetonated material to remain. More-
ver, the greater solubility of inorganic ions (solubility of 0.2 kg AN
n 1 m3 of water at 20 ◦C) would enhance their detection over that
f the organic residue (solubility of 0.008 kg RDX in 1 m3 of acetone
t 25 ◦C).
The non-stoichiometric relationship between the nitrate and
mmonium ions (7:1) was thought to differ from the theoretical
olar mass ratio of the two in ammonium nitrate (4:1) due to the2 values for linearity both with the 1 m datum (in red) and without (in black) are
nterpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred
suppressed conductivity detector used in IC analysis which would
have caused cation suppression [36,37]. The suppressor system was
required in order to generate solute speciﬁc detection (rather than
that including the eluent); the amount of ammonium detected in
each sample was therefore likely to be underestimated.
Due to it having a lower initial mass in the original charges (10%),
it is unsurprising that the lowest analyte quantities detected were
of Al (maximum mass detected ∼1 g); this ﬁnding supports other
studies that have found the added fuel component to be detected in
the lowest concentrations [22–24]. It is important to note however
that the ﬁltering step that was  necessary prior to chromatographic
and spectroscopic analyses could have caused the removal of alu-
minium and/or Al2O3, which would have been insoluble in the
water moistened swabs used to collect the inorganic samples. It
was not possible to retrieve any particulates trapped within the
ﬁlter and so this may  have caused the seemingly lower concentra-
tions. Nevertheless, aluminium was still detected, and as all of the
inorganic samples were treated with the same procedure, it could
be assumed that the detected amounts in each samples were rela-
tive to the actual deposited amounts (albeit by an unknown ratio);
in this case the higher quantities of Al at 5 m from the detonations
in the distribution patterns remains unexplained.
Despite potential sampling/extraction issues encountered, fuels
are likely to be incorporated as a smaller proportion of an explo-
sive charge and will therefore be less abundant in the post-blast
residues. This ampliﬁes the importance of understanding the move-
ment of additives during explosive releases; on suspicion of the use
of a chemically, biologically or radiologically modiﬁed IED at a post-
blast scene, with low, but potentially harmful, amounts of material
remaining, it would be necessary to identify areas exposed to such
particulates. The ﬁnding that the aluminium distributes differently
to the main explosive, and that it can be more difﬁcult to detect,
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romotes the need to further investigate its dispersal mechanism
and that of other particles that could be potential additives in an
xplosive charge).
.3. Dispersal mechanisms
.3.1. Residue distribution vs. blast wave
Each detonation produced blast-waves consistent with the
heoretical Friedlander waveforms [7,11,38] (see Appendix B of
upplementary material). A greater energy release from the PE4
11] manifested as higher peak overpressures (∼479 kPa) compared
o the AlAN formulations (∼170 kPa).
Hypothetically, undetonated explosive particulates may  be
jected away from the bulk charge due to the blast-wave, the
ositive overpressures of which could cause ejected residues to
e pushed outward from the charge surface due to a localised
ise in pressure at the charge periphery [18,19,39]. Whilst others
23,24] disagree with this theory, it is currently untested. As spher-
cal charges were used in these experiments, a uniform spherical
last-wave was assumed. If the blast was responsible for particle
otion away from the detonation, an inverse-square-like distri-
ution would be expected, as seen with the inorganic analytes,
hich decreased in concentration between 1 m and 4 m synony-
ously with the recorded overpressure (Fig. 4a). This would also be
xpected from the PE4 ﬁrings, however, RDX was  detected in lower
oncentrations at 1 m,  where blast overpressures were highest,
ompared to at 2 m where overpressures had decreased (Fig. 4b). Itstance around detonations of repeated ﬁrings of AlAN (a, b and c) and PE4 (d).
is plausible that initial particle dispersals due to the PE4 blasts may
have been affected subsequently by ﬁreball effects, causing lower
amounts to be detected at 1 m.  Why  this would not also occur for
the inorganic residues is unknown.
In order to assess the effect of the blast wave further, it would be
necessary to use high-speed imaging techniques capable of record-
ing at ultra-fast rates to monitor the movement of boundary layer
particles on the charge surface, which is currently challenging to
do.
3.3.2. Residue distribution vs. ﬁreball growth
In order to monitor the growth of ﬁreballs and any interactions
of the expanding gases with surrounding sampling sites, each det-
onation was  recorded with HSI and representative stills of ﬁrings of
each composition are presented in Appendix C of Supplementary
material. Contrary to the near symmetrical nature of blast-waves
from spherical charges [38], ﬁreball dynamics are more sensitive to
minor morphological variations [12,40]. The use of a singular angle
to record the detonations is reasonable here as it is assumed that
considerable variations in estimated ﬁreball radii would not have
occurred in unrecorded orientations around the detonations.
Due to instabilities occurring on both a molecular and macro
scale [40,41] neither formulation produced completely spherical
ﬁreballs. The surfaces of the AlAN ﬁreballs were ‘spiky’, potentially
due to Richtmeyer-Meshkov instabilities occurring at the bound-
ary layer between the ﬁreball and surrounding atmosphere, or due
to the protrusion of ﬁlamentary jets from the product gases, pro-
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Fig. 4. Blast over-pressure vs. average residue mass distribution for (a) AlAN detonations, and (b) PE4 detonations. The concept of the blast-wave itself carrying or promoting
the  movement of the particles remains unveriﬁed.
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aFig. 5. Representative HSI stills of spherical 0.5 kg AlAN detonation 
uced by the aluminium particles upon ignition (Fig. 5a and b)
40]. Closer inspection (i.e. higher magniﬁcation and resolution HSI
ecordings) of the perturbations on the surface of the AlAN ﬁreballs
ay  be able to indicate the cause of such irregularities more deﬁni-
ively. Particulate material was also visible between the blast-wave
nd ﬁreball surface during the AlAN ﬁrings (Fig. 5b), which may  be
ndecomposed explosive moving away from the ﬁreball region to
e deposited onto sampling sites, or is more likely the ignition of
luminium particles on reaction with atmospheric oxygen (as thise (t): (a) t = 1.01 ms,  (b) t = 1.67 ms,  (c) t = 3.00 ms and (d) t = 23.8 ms.
was not observed during the PE4 detonations, Fig. 6b). The obser-
vation of these particles within the layer between the blast wave
and ﬁreball contradicts the theory that the blast facilitates ejection
and movement of particles ahead of it.
As more moles of gas are produced by RDX (Eq. (1)) compared to
AN (Eq. (2)), the average size of the PE4 ﬁreballs, observed at their
maximum radius, were larger (approx. 2.2 m)  compared to those
of AlAN (approx. 1.3 m).  Any undecomposed explosive adhered to
a surface nearby the detonation may  be engulfed in the ﬁreball
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nd decompose on exposure of the ﬂame front (the temperature
f which would exceed the thermal decomposition temperature
ange of the analytes). Using atomic emission spectroscopy, tem-
eratures of ∼3000 K have been measured for RDX/HTPB ﬁreballs
esulting from detonation (e.g. Ref. [42]), these would be higher
han the decomposition temperatures of the resulting post-blast
roducts. The degradation of deposited residues due to the ﬁreball
s potentially supported here by the results of the RDX, which was
etected in lower quantities within the ﬁreball region (1 m)  than at
he edge of the ﬁreball region (2 m).  The reason for the RDX quan-
ity ﬂuctuations at further distances (4 m to 6 m,  c.f. Fig. 3d) from
he centre where the ﬁreball was not seen to extend is unknown
owever.
The addition of combustible metal particles such as Al is known
o increase ﬁreball temperatures [43], particularly in the post-blast
hase where the products continue to combust. The immediate
ost-blast temperature of the AlAN detonations would therefore
ave been at a higher temperature than that of the RDX-based
xplosives; this makes the ﬁnding of greater quantities of ammo-
ium and nitrate at the close by 1 m distances counterintuitive,
s these sampling sites were seen to be exposed to the ﬁreball
nd would have also experienced elevated post-blast tempera-
ure. Non-uniform temperatures within the AlAN ﬁreballs may
omehow facilitate the persistence of intact AN, which could subse-
uently be deposited on sampling plates during the smoke plume
ovement after ﬁreball decay, however the mechanism of how
N could not decompose at such high temperatures is currently
ncertain. (t), (a) t = 0.834 ms,  (b) t = 2.17 ms,  (c) t = 14.2 ms  and (d) t = 37.7 ms.
The aluminium was detected in greater quantities further from
the centre (at 5 m),  where the ﬁreball was  not observed to extend
to (c.f. Fig. 3c). The discrepancy in the aluminium data could be
attributed to non-uniform Al afterburning and an assessment of
the detonation temperature and immediate post-blast temperature
in our future experiments may  aid in understanding aluminium
combustion around the initial blast.
3.3.3. Residue distribution vs. environmental conditions
Environmental conditions, in particular the wind direction, have
been posited to affect the particulate dispersal during explosions
[18,24,32]; the wind speed during these ﬁrings varied between
2.8 m s−1 and 5.8 m/s  and was consistently in the northward, north-
westerly, and westward directions during all ﬁrings (Appendix
D of Supplementary material contains the recorded data for all
environmental parameters). These measurements were recorded
immediately prior to each ﬁring; although transient ﬂuctuations
would occur in the ambient ﬁeld, these would not be possible to
record during and nearby the detonations. Moreover it is the over-
all wind direction and velocity that governs the movement of the
smoke plume and it was  therefore assumed that over the time
period of signiﬁcant interest here (millisecond scale), the wind was
a steady ﬂow.
The amount of residue detected on sample sites positioned at
equal distances from the detonations, but in different orientations
about the centre, was dissimilar. This directional bias was  due to the
wind direction at the time of ﬁring as the majority of the greatest
quantities of analytes were recovered from sampling sites posi-
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ioned downwind (and the smoke plume had therefore moved
assed). Ammonium nitrate and RDX distributions were skewed
ith the wind direction in most cases (Fig. 7), indicating that the
ovement of undetonated residues was occurring in the smoke
lume, which would be governed by the wind ﬁeld. The trend
as less obvious for the aluminium though (Fig. 7b), which whilst
etected in the lowest amounts from upwind sites (south-facing)
as detected in the greatest quantities from eastward sites that
ere not in line with the wind direction. This is again suggestive
f additive material having a different dispersal mechanism and
otentially impacts on the way in which other additives may  move.
The means by which undetonated explosive particles can
emain within the smoke plume is unknown; the unreacted mate-
ial could persist somehow in the ﬁreball, the temperature of
hich would not be uniform throughout and regions of ‘lower’
emperature, relative to the ﬁreball centre for example, could
otentially facilitate the survival of intact explosive. Conversely,
on-uniformities in the charge conﬁguration may  lead to ejection of
aterial that is subsequently affected by the wind prior to comple-
ion of detonation. Though the exact mechanisms posited here for
ndetonated residue persistence remain speculative, it is clear that
here is a correlation between the depositions of most analytes with
he wind direction. In order to fully test the true effect of the wind
t would be necessary to conduct an experiment when there is no
ominant wind ﬁeld, or where an externally forced one-directional
ow can be applied, however such a ‘controlled’ test would not be
ossible during outdoor ﬁrings. In an ideal scenario, the use of an
ndoor ﬁring chamber would be an appropriate method of control-
ing the environmental conditions during ﬁring; such a chamber
ould need to be large enough so that signiﬁcant blast reﬂections
rom walls were not encountered in areas of sampling, and it would
eed to be free from explosive residue contamination from any
revious ﬁrings.
. Conclusions
Mathematical models can be applied to understanding general
article distribution patterns during detonation, however, actual
rends are analyte speciﬁc. The distribution of AN is thought to
ccur as multi-phase process, initially spalled from the charge
urface, potentially caused by blast-wave effects, particles can con-
equently disperse approximately according to an inverse-square
aw model. Subsequently, any residual undetonated material
mongst the gaseous products is dispersed in the smoke plume
y the wind. The PE4 distributions were more random; thermale centres for (a) ammonium and nitrate, (b) aluminium and RDX.
degradation of closely deposited undetonated particles due to the
ﬁreball expansion is likely, with the wind ﬁeld again being the more
robust dispersal mechanism. Aluminium, added to the AN, was  the
only analyte that was consistently detected in greater quantities
further from the detonations, indicating the dispersal mechanism
of additives is different to that of the base-explosive analytes.
The ﬁndings here support forensic practices of sampling for
explosive residues around the central detonation region (not nec-
essarily at the explosion seat or centre), but also highlight further
important criteria that should be considered, including the use of
CCTV if available, to establish the movement of the smoke cloud
and thereby determine potential residue deposition sites at fur-
ther distances from the detonation centre, up to 10 m away even.
This current study also stimulates new, important questions such
as how can undetonated explosive remain within product gas
expansion in the ﬁrst instance? And, why  does the movement of
additives vary to that of the base explosive analytes, and how does
this change when the complexity of the system is increased (i.e.
using non-spherical, conﬁned charges positioned near structures)?
Development of such a particle dispersion knowledge base would
beneﬁt sampling procedures for forensic, public health and envi-
ronmental decontamination purposes in the post-blast domain.
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